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Assessing South Africa’s New Growth Path: framework for change?1
Ben Fine∗
School of Oriental and African Studies, London, UK
The New Growth Path (NGP) is the symbolic policy document of South Africa’s newly
formed Department of Economic Development. It marks an intended break with the
growth path of the ﬁrst two decades of the post-apartheid era. But does it do so in
principle and is it likely to do so in practice? This paper suggests otherwise because
of its failure to address, let alone remedy, the key determining features of the post-
apartheid economic landscape. These are the (international) ﬁnancialisation of
(domestic) conglomerate capital especially associated with (illegal) capital ﬂight, the
complicity of a newly formed black elite, and the continuing reliance upon how these
interact with South Africa’s longstanding minerals–energy complex (MEC). Without
breaking with these features, the NGP in particular, and policy more generally, will
seek to temper the gains and organisational opposition of better-off workers for
putative beneﬁts to those deprived of employment and basic levels of public provision.
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Foreword
The processes leading to the election of Jacob Zuma as President of South Africa in May
2009, were also associated with political realignments, government restructuring, and hopes
amongst progressives that the new guard would build upon what is increasingly being inter-
preted as a successful political transformation as the foundation for an otherwise delayed
economic transformation (see ANC policy discussion documents released in March
2012).2 For government, its provision for a shift in the trajectory for the post-apartheid
economy depends upon what are effectively two new departments created by the incoming
Zuma government – the Department of Economic Planning and the National Planning
Commission. However, the formation of these two departments reﬂects a compromise,
rather than a break, between the old and the new regimes. For, within the Presidency,
Trevor Manuel, erstwhile ﬁnance minister and the politician most closely associated with
past economic policies, was appointed to head the National Planning Commission with
responsibility for long-term strategy. In November 2011, the National Development Plan
(NDP) was published by the Commission. It is critically assessed in Fine (2012a); see
also Sender (2012). But, in parallel with the Planning Commission, Zuma also appointed
Ebrahim Patel, former general secretary of the Southern African Clothing and Textiles
Workers’ Union (SACTWU) to the cabinet as Minister for Economic Development.
Patel published his own strategy as the New Growth Path (NGP) in November 2010, a
year ahead of the NDP but of which the latter takes little notice.
This should not be interpreted as a sign of irreconcilable conﬂicts swept under the
carpet, and the NGP and NDP share more in common than they differ. What follows is
a critique of the NGP, drafted in response to an informal request from the National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) as soon as the NDP was made available
to support the union in formulating its response to this important policy and political docu-
ment. As is apparent, it is more a scholarly than an activist text offering some degree of
analytical support for those understandably suspicious of the NGP as such and its likely
impact in practice upon policy. The strengths and weaknesses (and omissions) of the
NGP are highlighted by reference to South African realities pointing to what is not
(yet) on the policy agenda that needs to be in view of the goal of propelling South
Africa to the status of a BRICS developmental state, the new transformational goal that
was initiated by the earlier Mbeki regime as it sought to retain credibility (Ashman
et al. 2010a, 2013). In short, as things stand, even if progressives win on the basis of
the policy document conﬂict, if such there is between NGP and NDP, it will be at most
a pyrrhic victory if not taken much further beyond the policy pressure points, processes
and interests that inform the NGP.
This stance highlights and reﬂects the need to contextualise the NGP in the continuing if
now almost two decades of transition from apartheid (for which there is sufﬁcient time
elapsed to consider conditions as being reproduced and not simply inherited from an
oppressive past). First observe, though, that policy documents come and go, and thick
and fast, in South Africa. They surely, even primarily, serve as occasional smokescreens
around policies adopted in practice and the underlying realities that inﬂuence them and
to which they respond. Thus, whilst the plan for Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR) admittedly signalled a neoliberal turn when adopted in 1996, and was apparently
motivated by the wish to attract foreign direct investment and to calm the (international)
‘markets’,3 its main role has been to allow for capital outﬂow by domestic conglomerates
on an unprecedented scale with minimal inward direct investment by way of compensation,
vital issues which tend to be overlooked in policy documents and debates (see below).
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Second, GEAR has then been so readily and correctly recognised to have been a neo-
liberal turn, whether to serve the international markets or traditional white capital, that any
subsequent policy reform has inevitably been seen as a reaction against it, not least with the
dramatic political events associated with the ascendancy of Zuma. But, as is at least
implicitly revealed in the following critique of the NGP, perceiving policy along a conti-
nuum of more or less neoliberalism (or more or less developmental state for that matter)
is simply misleading if not wrong. For the last two decades are better seen in terms of
the following factors: international restructuring of South African capital (both inward
and outward) in general; its ﬁnancialisation (see below) in particular; the creation and
strengthening of a black elite on this basis and through favourable relations, occasionally
corrupt, with the state; and control of alternative forces for progressive change at the
expense of minimal concessions (of which Mbeki to Zuma and from GEAR ultimately
to NGP and NDP are symbolic). This is all especially so if set against the continuing
social and economic inequalities and massive levels of unemployment characteristic of
the post-apartheid period (Marais 2011).4
Indeed, the relative dismantling and marginalisation of the progressive forces that
brought down the apartheid regime would be the most striking aspect of the post-apartheid
period were it not for the restructuring of international and domestic capital, in and out of
South Africa, and its associated spawning of a new black elite that is far from developmen-
tal. Further, these developments have been so prominent that even the collective interests
involved have fallen foul of the policy processes underpinning, or accommodating them,
as signalled by electricity power cuts for example, where the troika of privatisation,
black economic empowerment, and interdepartmental coordination across government
(other than under the thumb of ﬁnance) has failed to gel. More generally, prospects for a
developmental state are laughable unless domestic levels of investment double, something
that simply cannot occur unless ﬁnance is taken in hand – not simply a policy prescription
but a total reversal of the economic and political dynamics underpinning the post-apartheid
period and the corresponding interests that they have come to serve.
Third, nor is this depressing narrative a simple tale of the triumph of (international)
markets over progressive alternatives, nor the ebb and ﬂow of the delicate balance of a
coalition of elite interests against those of a majority struggling for alternatives. The
abiding tragedy of the South African transition albeit with its own peculiarities, as more
generally revealed by the global crisis, is the extent to which the dysfunctions of capitalism
in the era of ﬁnancialisation have been to intensify social and economic inequalities, not
least through low levels of investment, employment and social provision. As revealed
now in Europe in dramatic terms, ﬁscal deﬁcits go hand-in-hand with democratic deﬁcits,
against which policy documents such as the NGP in South Africa merely represent the
tilting at windmills.
In what follows, the ﬁrst section highlights how the NGP is framed around ambitious
and commendable targets but only insofar as they are accommodated by trade-offs
offered by the better paid and organised sections of the working class (with no guarantees
of feasibility or delivery in return for their sacriﬁces and co-operation). The next sections
questions whether such trade-offs are necessary once account is taken of the ways in
which policy has been complicit with, or has even promoted, the key economic dynamic
of the post-apartheid period, namely the (international) ﬁnancialisation of its conglomerates
with a particularly severe drain of resources in the form of (illegal) capital ﬂight. The next
two sections reveal the limitations of the NGP by reference to the experiences of China and
developmental states. This is followed by a discussion that highlights how a number of the
more detailed policies to be found in the NGP are limited, compromised and/or ﬂawed, not
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least for failure to challenge, let alone take account of, the previously identiﬁed determi-
nants of South African economic performance. The concluding remarks suggest that
policy practice, let alone proposals, will have to progress far beyond, and different from
the NGP if progressive change is to be achieved.
New Growth Path for old?
There is much to commend the framework underpinning the NGP in terms of its objectives.
First and foremost is to acknowledge the need for a break with the old growth path although
there remain doubts to some extent over how the old is conceived and how the new breaks
with it both in trajectory and driving force.
Second is the emphasis on addressing decent work, poverty, labour absorption, a social
wage, and a greener economy. It is far from clear, however, that in its goals the NGP rep-
resents either much of a break with the old growth path (as opposed to its achievements) or
offers more than the buzzwords and fuzzwords of developmental discourse.5 After all, the
NGP could hardly explicitly seek to worsen working conditions, poverty, labour absorption,
the social wage, and the environment, and hope to get away with it in contemporary South
Africa! Signiﬁcantly, where the NGP is explicit in projecting pain rather than gain is in its
clear intention of moderating wage settlements of those earning between ZAR3000 and
ZAR20,000 per month (p. 26). The presumption is that this will allow other objectives
to be met, but how (by what mechanisms) and how much (employment, social wage,
poverty alleviation, etc.) is left somewhat vague although it is advised ‘it requires some
sacriﬁce from union members . . . the New Growth Path must ensure that economic and
social policies demonstrably reward any sacriﬁce by members with real gains for the
working class as a whole’ (p. 29). How is this to be done let alone demonstrated?
Unfortunately, this stance exhibits some considerable afﬁnity with the old growth path,
at least as far as the pain of union members is concerned, even if sugared by the promise of
gain for others. The implication is that too high levels of (higher) wages are a signiﬁcant
burden on the economy in terms of employment generated and space for ﬁscal expansion.
It is precisely such analytics that the NGP might have been expected to abandon without
thereby degenerating into ﬁscal irresponsibility, although the latter will be charged what-
ever minor or major breaks are proposed from the dictates of sound ﬁnance and reliance
on market forces. To put this another way, whenever there is unemployment of whatever
level, there will be those who argue it can be ameliorated by reducing labour costs. To what-
ever degree this is true, and it is clearly affected by a myriad of other, arguably much more
important macro and micro determinants of employment, it does not begin to get to grips
with the massive unemployment characteristic of South Africa that does not derive from
the wage levels of unionised and better paid workers. That this assumes some prominence
in the NGP might be a compromise aimed at reassuring and incorporating business into
social partnership. But as the framework itself observes that the country’s proﬁt share is
high and has been increasing (p. 3), this would hardly seem to be necessary, effective or,
to put it bluntly as the main effect of wage restraint, desirable.
Third, welcome within the framework is the identiﬁcation of some key features of the
old growth path, not least dependence on the minerals value chain (but without mentioning
the minerals–energy complex – see below), the misuse of commodity-based revenues, the
undue dependence on short-run capital inﬂows, backlogs and bottlenecks in infrastructure,
and monopoly pricing in key sectors. Addressing why these should have occurred and,
correspondingly, how they will be remedied, remains weak other than through guilt by
association with the past as opposed to the promise of the future. Indicatively, we are
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told that 150,000 new security guards emerged between 2002 and 2008 (one in 14 of new
jobs); that the top 10% of households capture 40% of income (p. 5); and that the share of
proﬁts rose from 40% to 45% between 1994 and 2009 (with a corresponding fall in share of
wages). Good points but so what? Analytical leverage in embarking upon a new growth
path requires a close and convincing account of what factors have given rise to such nega-
tive outcomes, and are measures prospectively in hand sufﬁcient to tackle them in the
future.
Nor is this simply a matter of the right and new policies but of a shift in the balance of
economic, political and ideological power, and its appropriate representation through
policy. This is explicitly targeted, if not in these terms, by the NGP, and is the context
within which to locate the NGP’s appeal to social dialogue and partnership, over and
above its intent to moderate higher wage increases. The framework recognises that its
success depends upon participation with, no doubt, an eye to the resentment of the
previously imposed and non-negotiable GEAR: ‘In South Africa, no technocratic solution
– if it existed – could be imposed from above. We must develop this New Growth Path in
conditions of active, noisy democracy’ (p. 30).6 Yet, it is precisely such ‘noisy democracy’
that has characterised the old growth path, and the framework offers little or no explanation
for why this has failed to deliver in the past. The one exception, to belabour the point, is to
suggest the need to moderate wage increases of better-paid workers. Whilst some token
sacriﬁces are also required of capital and their managers, this reworking of social dialogue
and partnership, as with unemployment, is at most token and fails to confront how it will
depart from the old growth path in terms of shifts in the balance of power and its represen-
tation in policy to achieve stated goals.
Indeed, the NGP might have acknowledged that it is labour and progressive noise in
opposition to the old growth path that has allowed the new to emerge. But of equal signiﬁ-
cance to noisy democracy is the silent, undemocratic, even illegal manoeuvres of capital to
which I now turn.
From tradeoffs to capital ﬂight
Despite then, the NGP’s partial virtues and strengths, there are arguably signiﬁcantly deeper
weaknesses and even inconsistencies in the framework.7 The most immediate and striking
is the starting point that, ‘achieving the New Growth Path requires that we address key tra-
deoffs’ (p. 2; emphasis added). These trade-offs are then listed as between ‘present con-
sumption and future growth’, across ‘infrastructure, skills and other interventions’,
between high beneﬁts and risks,8 a strong rand and competitiveness, and ‘the present
costs and future beneﬁts of a green economy’.
Now trade-offs, or zero-sum outcomes in other parlance, are only necessary when the
economy is working at full capacity. This is evidently not the case in South Africa, as
indeed is highlighted by the NGP’s account and targeting of unemployment. Further,
immediately before listing these putative trade-offs, attention is drawn to the need to
address inefﬁciencies and constraints, each of which has the potential to substitute positive
for zero-sum outcomes. Indeed, this might be thought, at least in principle, to be one of the
ﬁrst calls upon policy.
Of course, it is symbolic of Keynesianism that, in the context of mass (and for South
Africa, also chronic) unemployment, attention to trade-offs as opposed to trade-ups as it
were, is liable to be self-defeating. Moreover, emphasis on trade-offs is equally more
deeply symbolic both of neoliberal policymaking in general and the old growth path(s)
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in particular, raising doubts over how seriously a break has been made (a theme that will
recur here).
Further, the rhetoric of trade-offs is also indicative of an unfortunate, if inconsistent,
approach to labour as expendable if not expended. For the inspiration for the trade-offs
revolves around the availability of non-labour resources and how they are deployed –
we have to have trade-offs because we only have limited resources (other than labour).
Here, though, there is one crucial oversight that has been so commonplace in practice,
and yet overlooked to the point of almost absolute neglect, that it can only best be described
as the elephant in the room. This is the issue of capital ﬂight. For South Africa, it is and has
been on an unprecedented scale, much of it totally illegal (and managed by large-scale cor-
porations through transfer pricing – declaring value of exports from South Africa at a lower
price than charged to importing countries).9 Illegal capital ﬂight was certainly extensive
during the apartheid period but it has attained new and dramatic heights subsequently,
exceeding 20% of gross domestic product (GDP) in its peak year in 2007.
Unfortunately, far from addressing this problem, the record of post-apartheid govern-
ments has been at best to turn a blind eye, and at worst to facilitate it, as illegal capital
ﬂight has increasingly been legalised with a programme of relaxation of exchange controls.
Recent developments indicate that this syndrome of ignoring the elephant is at last being
rectiﬁed, but only in the most perverse of ways. Government only a year ago announced
its intention to grant an amnesty for illegal capital ﬂight upon payment of a 10% penalty,
as a step towards removing all exchange controls. This is akin to recognising the elephant
in the room by tolerating its presence despite the enormous (policy) space it occupies or
precludes. The South African Reserve Bank and the Treasury have been little short of scan-
dalous in their failure to report upon and, one must suspect, pursue illegal capital ﬂight,
let alone take into account what impact it has had upon the economy. There has been
little or no investigation of its incidence or the likely effect of the proposed amnesty
(who would declare, and why, with an amnesty around the corner and no apparent inves-
tigation, and so on, and what about tax that has been failed to be paid). As far as these
two lax guardians of sound ﬁnance and austerity are concerned, it is as if capital ﬂight
does not exist and, if it does, that it is best to work around it.10
In short, whilst the NGP calls for ‘systemic changes to mobilise domestic investment
around activities that can create sustainable employment’ (p. 1), it overlooks the single
Figure 1.
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most important proximate factor that needs to be addressed in order to achieve this goal (as
well as failing to offer any analysis of why South Africa’s long-term record is one of chronic
underinvestment and how this will be remedied). Nor is this simply a matter of lost
resources (that might be compared with the savings from moderating wage increases).
For capital ﬂight also squeezes the frontiers along which putative policy trade-offs are
made. And it is only when we get beyond its squeeze (and that of ﬁnancialisation more gen-
erally – see below) that policies can be more fully engaged that not only mobilise invest-
ment but also in the appropriate activities. Thus, the trade-off that the NGP should have
targeted is between capital ﬂight and the capacity for policy, not between policies with
capital ﬂight taken for granted or, it might be added, even condoned.
Financialisation meets the MEC
Now, neither the effects of capital ﬂight outlined above nor their causes spring from
nowhere, alongside the other challenges posed for the post-apartheid economy. This
crucial, even decisive, and certainly symbolic, aspect of the South African economy is
the product and interaction of both global and domestic forces. At the global level, as
starkly revealed by the current crisis, the world economy has been subject to what has
been termed ‘ﬁnancialisation’.11 In brief, ﬁnancialisation has involved the phenomenal
expansion of ﬁnancial assets relative to real activity (by three times over the last 30
years); the proliferation of types of assets, from derivatives through to futures markets
with a corresponding explosion of acronyms; the absolute and relative expansion of specu-
lative as opposed to or at the expense of real investment; a shift in the balance of productive
to ﬁnancial imperatives within the private sector whether ﬁnancial or not; increasing
inequality in income arising out of weight of ﬁnancial rewards; consumer-led booms
based on credit; the penetration of ﬁnance into ever more areas of economic and social
life such as pensions, education, health, and provision of economic and social infrastruc-
ture; the emergence of a neoliberal culture of reliance upon markets and private capital
and corresponding anti-statism despite the extent to which the rewards to private ﬁnance
have in part derived from state ﬁnance itself.
However we understand ﬁnancialisation, its consequences have been reductions in
overall levels and efﬁcacy of real investment as ﬁnancial instruments and activities
expand at its expense even if excessive investment does take place in particular sectors
at particular times (as with the dotcom bubble of a decade ago); prioritising shareholder
value, or ﬁnancial worth, over other economic and social values; pushing of policies
towards conservatism and commercialisation in all respects; extending inﬂuence of
ﬁnance more broadly, both directly and indirectly, over economic and social policy;
placing more aspects of economic and social life at the risk of volatility from ﬁnancial
instability and, conversely, placing the economy and social life at risk of crisis from triggers
within particular markets (as with the food and energy crises that preceded the ﬁnancial
crisis). Whilst, then, ﬁnancialisation is a single word, it is attached to a wide variety of
different forms and effects of ﬁnance even if with the United States and the United
Kingdom to the fore and other economies, such as Greece, subject to the severest of
adjustments.
To some degree, ﬁnancialisation (not the old growth path) is the key to understanding
the malaise of South African economy and society, once wedded to an understanding of
it as historically and currently dominated by the minerals–energy complex (MEC). What
is this MEC, recognised at most in a token fashion in the New Growth Path by reference
to ‘dependence on the minerals value chain [and] . . . Weaknesses in the state’s use of
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commodity-based revenue for economic diversiﬁcation and skills development’ (p. 5)? It is
the speciﬁcally South African system of accumulation that has been centred on core sectors
around, but more wide-ranging than, mining and energy, evolving with a character and
dynamic of its own that has shifted over time. Its history and consequences can be
traced back to the emergence of mining in the 1870s through to the present day. In the inter-
war and immediate post-war period, core MEC sectors drove the economy, furnishing a
surplus for the protection and growth and, ultimately, incorporation of Afrikaner capital.
State corporations in electricity, steel, transport and so on, represented an accommodation
across the economic power of the mining conglomerates and the political power of the Afri-
kaners, an uneasy compromise of evolving fractions of classes and their interests forged
through both state and market. The apartheid labour systems were less an accommodation
than a common bond across capitals and against labour. But the divisions between Afrika-
ner and mining capitals precluded a more general strategy of industrial diversiﬁcation out of
core MEC sectors, leading to a partial vacuum in intermediate and capital goods capability,
a failure to accrue economies of scale and scope other than in core MEC sectors, and an
inefﬁcient consumer goods industry surviving by protection upon demand.
But, by the 1970s, Afrikaner and mining-related capital had been sufﬁciently integrated
for a common economic strategy to be adopted, as had always been the case for labour
systems. However, with the collapse of the post-war boom and the Bretton Woods
system based on gold at US$35 per ounce, and the sharp rise in oil and energy prices, a
huge premium attached to both gold and energy. As a result, an industrial strategy for diver-
siﬁcation was scarcely considered let alone adopted. Instead, the 1970s witnessed an extra-
ordinary state-led expansion of gold and energy production. Into the 1980s, the crisis of
apartheid also precluded a state and/or private strategy for industrial promotion. But,
whilst the core MEC industries remained central to the economy, capital controls meant
that proﬁts generated internally that were not illegally transferred abroad (see below)
were conﬁned to accumulation within the South African economy itself. This gave rise
both to further conglomeration across the economy but, ﬁrst and foremost, to the expansion
of a huge and sophisticated ﬁnancial system as cause and consequence of the internationally
conﬁned, but domestically spread, reach of the South African conglomerates with Anglo
American in the lead.
The MEC is the system of accumulation that was inherited by post-apartheid South
Africa, and it has survived more or less intact over the post-apartheid period. This is not
to say it has remained unchanged, quite the opposite, just as it has experienced signiﬁcant
change in the past. Unfortunately, those changes have, however, reﬂected the extent to
which South Africa is the exact opposite of a development state (see below) and has
been driven further away from being so.12 In particular, the South African economy over
the post-apartheid period has been driven by what might be termed a backlog in ﬁnancia-
lisation and globalisation that was inherited from the apartheid period. These have domi-
nated both the low pace of domestic accumulation and the form and composition taken
by the restructuring of the domestic economy. Whilst the MEC core sectors have strength-
ened, the fastest growing sector in the economy over the last 20 years has been ﬁnance and
related services, now taking as much as 20% of GDP, although 40% of the population
beneﬁt from no ﬁnancial services at all.
Now according to the efﬁcient market hypothesis (itself a form of trade-off economics
in the extreme), as far as those supporting ﬁnancialisation are concerned, the role of ﬁnan-
cial markets is to provide for the efﬁcient mobilisation and allocation of resources to invest-
ment. Has this been done by the South African ﬁnancial system? Not at all, domestic levels
of investment are running at half those generally acknowledged to be necessary for
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developmental state status. And where are all the resources going? Well, one answer has
already been provided, they go into the ﬁnancial sector itself. I exaggerate somewhat as,
of course, some ﬁnancial services are completely essential, like high-security protection
of the rewards and properties of the most unequal society in the world (150,000 new
jobs after all). But, effectively, far from adding 20% to GDP, ﬁnancial services are
taking away a quarter of GDP and cheekily suggesting that by doing so they add the equiv-
alent to GDP.13 Across the world, three times as many ﬁnancial assets are now required to
serve one unit of GDP than 30 years ago. If this were true of any other input, such as energy,
steel, or whatever, we would be outraged. But ﬁnance gets away with it. And, as already
mentioned, the South African situation is even more serious and disturbing because this
ﬁnancialisation is not only associated, as elsewhere, with exaggerated rewards to those
working within ﬁnance, and conducive to credit-based levels of consumption based on
speculation in housing markets, it has been accompanied by the most extreme levels of
illegal capital ﬂight.14
As a component part of globalisation and ﬁnancialisation, capital ﬂight places the
(macro)economy on the cusp of instability, and this has had to be accommodated in
South Africa, and has even driven, macroeconomic policy to serve its needs. The frame-
work recognises this but in an elephantine way:
A persistent balance-of-trade deﬁcit funded with short-term capital inﬂows (essentially foreign
investment in equities and in 2009/10 increasingly in interest-bearing assets), attracted largely
by interest rates that were high by international standards. In effect, the country borrowed
abroad to sustain government spending, investment and household consumption which
remained heavily biased toward the well off. Both investment and domestic savings remained
below the levels required for sustained growth. (p. 5)
This is all true but misses the main point. Interest rates have in effect been held high,
whether intended or not, in order that short-term capital inﬂows (a source of volatility)
can compensate for long-term (illegal) outﬂows. And the exchange rate has been held at
a high level with the effect of making capital outﬂows worth more in foreign currency to
those who beneﬁt from them, whilst making it ever more difﬁcult to sustain both the
exchange rate and competitive economic growth. Indeed, it is not the case that short-
term inﬂows, ‘enabled the country to spend more than it earned’ (p. 4). It allowed it to
send abroad what it earned although, of course, ‘the country’ is a euphemism for a very
few select companies and individuals.
This is of profound signiﬁcance for the restructuring of domestic industry which has not
been driven by the need to ﬁll in the hollowed-out industrial structure inherited from apart-
heid, with its limited capacity to build upon the MEC core strengths and diversify through
capital and intermediate to more competitive and higher quality consumption goods. Rather
the conglomerate structure has been dismantled to create sectoral monopolies whose proﬁt-
ability depends upon high prices and not productivity increase, the very antithesis of the
much needed three-high economy – high investment, high productivity and high wages.
Again, this is acknowledged, if only weakly, in pointing to ‘continued economic concen-
tration in key sectors, permitting rent-seeking at the expense of consumers and industrial
development’ (p. 5). What has been, and remains, notably absent is the corresponding com-
mitment to secure long-term ﬁnance for investment in labour-intensive domestic production
to meet domestic consumption of basic needs, thereby creating jobs, alleviating unemploy-
ment and addressing the backlog of provision and inequality inherited from apartheid.
Again, with token if signiﬁcant exceptions, inequalities have strengthened post-apartheid.
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Now it is against the accommodation of these various elephants in the room – ﬁnancia-
lisation, illegal capital ﬂight, and the continuing imperatives of the MEC – that the hard
trade-offs highlighted by the framework need to be assessed. For instance, it is claimed
without further speciﬁcation that, ‘global economic turmoil has also opened up new
policy space for developing economies to go beyond conventional policy prescriptions’
(p. 4). If so, itself indisputable if balancing some minor concessions in the rhetoric of the
Washington institutions in deference to neoliberalism’s tarnished reputation and worsening
economic conditions, South Africa is certainly not seizing that new policy space just as it
did not seize or even test the space that was previously available (rather than warmly embra-
cing its conﬁnes under the neoliberal GEAR). Moreover, cabinet has already rejected the
idea of taxing short-term capital inﬂows (let me remind you that these underpin long-
term capital outﬂows).15 As previously indicated, the NGP proceeds oblivious to the
proposed amnesty granted on capital ﬂight and the corresponding intention to liberalise
exchange controls completely.
Lessons from China. . .
This is exactly the opposite of the way in which China, for example, has been so successful
over the past few decades. Its economic development has been primarily based on rapidly
expanding domesticmarkets, complemented but not dominated by exports which are highly
import-intensive. This has been accompanied by relatively rapid growth in labour pro-
ductivity, contingent upon very high levels of investment and has given rise to increasing
real wages and even the emergence of shortages for skilled labour. A full account of the
processes involved is not necessary here but one to highlight is the staggering dependence
of China upon banks for ﬁnance for industrial investment. It is proportionately roughly four
times higher than for the United States, and at least double that of most other countries. This
is, however, indicative of the limited extent of ﬁnancialisation of the Chinese economy,
since ﬁnance has derived primarily from state-owned banks that have been policy driven.
Of course, this does not guarantee developmental success in the absence of other conditions
but these are precisely what have been present in China where, nonetheless, development is
fraught by the tensions associated with sustaining international competitiveness and dom-
estic economic and social stability.
In short, though, the lessons to be learned from China for national developmentalism
are, broadly and overgeneralising, in contemporary conditions, especially in the wake of
the current crisis, that a corresponding positive role for the state depends upon: insulating
the mobilisation and allocation of ﬁnance from ﬁnancialisation in all of its forms (including
illegal capital ﬂight); the promotion of secure domestic provision of goods for domestic
consumption especially as far as the meeting of basic needs and poverty alleviation are con-
cerned; and a strong commitment to state provision of social and economic infrastructure
attached to a ‘developmental welfare state’,16 and targeted industrial (and other) strategies
designed to expand employment and productivity in line with corresponding increases in
wages.
Signiﬁcantly, the framework only mentions China as a source of co-operative opportu-
nity. This is an important factor but one-sided. More speciﬁcally, as far as China might serve
as an enabling factor in the promotion of desirable developments elsewhere including South
Africa, its size and diversity give rise to a complex mix of complementary opportunities and
sources of competition. Inevitably, these are variously spread across different countries, at
different stages of development, across different sectors, technological capabilities and
levels of value-added, and corresponding position within global value chains/networks.
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Across the literature more generally, the levels of uncertainty and unevenness involved are
conducive to appeal to metaphor as China is variously understood as Engine, Conduit, or
Steamroller as far as other economies are concerned, or is it a perpetrator of Flying Geese or
of Sitting Ducks. Policy in South Africa will need to be much more extensive and reﬁned if
it is to escape its old growth path irrespective of its relations with China.
. . . To developmental state
And lessons will have to be learned from comparative experience, not least from China
itself. The framework notably draws upon no comparative nor historical experience at all
in identifying and justifying policies that might launch the NGP. The minor exception is
the implicit, if token and obligatory, reference to South Africa as a developmental state
with, presumably, some resonances with successes of the East Asian newly industrialised
countries (NICs) and, possibly, beyond. There are, however, essentially only a couple of
uses of the term. One is for it to coordinate and prioritise the state’s efforts (p. 6). The
other suggests that its role is ‘to minimise costs for business’ other than in making trade-
offs for greener economy and equity (p. 28). This comes within an entire subsection on
the developmental state which otherwise adds little other than that all state agencies
should pull together. But, in order not to give the wrong impression, it is emphasised
that, ‘a developmental state is not simply hostage to market forces and vested interests.
Through careful alliances, clear purpose and by leveraging its resource and regulatory
capacity, it can align market outcomes with development needs’ (p. 28). In other words,
remarkably and unnecessarily, the developmental state would appear to be precisely con-
ceived as a hostage to market forces and vested interests but, with a bit of leverage, may
be induced to do something else as well.
This is not the place to go into debate over the strengths and weaknesses of the devel-
opmental state paradigm (DSP) in general, let alone whether South Africa comes anywhere
near approaching conditions that might allow it to be deﬁned as such – which it does not.17
In the 1980s, the DSP successfully deployed the empirical experience of the East Asian
NICs to display the profound weaknesses of the neoliberal Washington Consensus
dogma and the essential role played by state intervention to bring about latecomer,
catch-up industrialisation. In doing so, amongst its other limitations, the DSP placed
undue emphasis upon the relations between (industrial) capital and the state at the
expense of the role of labour (as well as welfare, democracy and other aspects of develop-
ment other than industrial performance). Over the past decade, following a loss of popular-
ity around the turn of the millennium, the DSP has enjoyed something of a revival. But, in
doing so, it has been both diluted and indiscriminately spread in its application. Almost any-
thing that the state does can now be perceived to be developmental, and claims as such can
be made equally readily.
Lest we forget, and both reﬂecting and contributing to this revival, discourse around the
developmental state in South Africa was the result of a failed attempt of the Mbeki regime
in its death throes to restore some credibility to its old growth path and failing political
popularity and credibility. Inevitably, its adoption for the NGP could hardly be faithful to
the earlier version associated with the East Asian NICs, of excluding labour, social dialo-
gue, welfare and so on. And, as observed, the revived DSP readily allows for these to be
added on in superﬁcial and token ways. In effect, the NGP accepts the necessity of incor-
porating labour into its developmental state but, essentially, in order to ensure it is complicit
with the sacriﬁces it will have to make (as opposed to them being imposed as is often
supposed of the authoritarian East Asian NICs).
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Twixt politics and policies
Thus, what is striking in the framework’s use of the developmental state is the shallowness
in the politics of what is involved. The ﬁrst reference to the developmental state is immedi-
ately followed by an appeal to ‘effective social dialogue that . . . facilitates the necessary
tradeoffs and sacriﬁces’ (p. 6). It is complemented by four references to ‘social capital’,
including this as a ‘job driver’. Once again, this is entirely without substance and serves
more of a marker, intended or not, of worthy intentions rather than of addressing the evol-
ving structures of power and privilege within South Africa. Having written two books
ripping the notion of social capital to shreds, I can hardly be expected to be sympathetic
to it (Fine 2001 and 2010c). Again, this is not the place to rehearse my concerns other
than to observe that social capital has served to raise self-help from the individual to the
level of the collective (thereby for collectives to be blamed for their own condition for
not helping themselves), has never been shown to contribute to policymaking (other than
as an ideological support to the predetermined), and has studiously ignored the ‘social
capital’ of the rich, privileged and powerful (those taking their capital out of the country
whilst courting the complicity of a new black elite, the so-called bridging social capital
of new and old wealth to which we should be paying much more critical attention than
does the NGP).
In short, this is evidence of little or no determination to shift the politics from that of the
old growth path, primarily relying upon private capital. For, mass unemployment in South
Africa to the contrary, it is simply asserted that, ‘In a mixed economy, private business is a
core driver of jobs and economic growth’ (p. 28; emphasis added). We clearly need a new
core driver if this is the case. Signiﬁcantly, the discourse around mixed economy immedi-
ately after the demise of apartheid was attached to a compromise with the private sector in
which the role of the state would be expanded. What is now presumed to be the old growth
path soon changed this. But both undue reliance upon, and misreading of, the South African
private sector are retained by the NGP. For, whilst appeal is made to the participation and
co-operation of the labour movement, it is always in terms of an accord in which it makes
sacriﬁces even if, as remarked, ‘with real gains for the working class as a whole’ (p. 29). In
this respect, there is an asymmetry relative to capital from which only limited sacriﬁce is
called for although, in light of the severity of capital ﬂight, its role is totally misjudged.
For, even if it is accepted that ‘business has its weaknesses’, this is because, for the
NGP, it ‘has often been reactive and inwardly focussed’. Indeed, ‘Too many business
leaders have missed opportunities offered by the profound changes since 1994’ (p. 29).
On the contrary, business leaders have been extraordinarily strong not weak, aggressive
not reactive, outwardly not inwardly focused, and have taken full advantage of the oppor-
tunities offered since 1994 – to take capital out of the country, to a large extent illegally!
Interestingly, then, unlike unions who are to make sacriﬁces for the common good
because of the presumed need for trade-offs, the framework indicts business for (falsely
identiﬁed) weaknesses, missed opportunities, and so on, with the implicit presumption
that it need not make sacriﬁces, merely improve its performance at nobody’s expense but
to everybody’s beneﬁt. An obvious question is why did business not take these beneﬁcial
opportunities in the ﬁrst place, and credibility is beginning to be stretched as soon as we also
throw in how much business has beneﬁtted over the post-apartheid period in terms of proﬁt-
ability, etc. Moreover, irrespective of egalitarian reasons for redistribution of income and
wealth, even the mis-targeted indictments of business by the framework are sufﬁcient to
suggest that public ownership needs to be an essential component for rectifying these
deﬁciencies. This is accepted for ‘public’ provision, such as health, education and much
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social and economic infrastructure, but needs to be extended beyond this, especially as
business does not simply fail to take opportunities but positively campaigns and organises
to prevent, even to circumscribe, the state from doing so as is so evident from negotiations
for the transition from apartheid onwards.
Signiﬁcantly, though, despite its high proﬁle in current debate, the option of extending
public ownership is not seriously addressed in the framework. This is not to suggest that
nationalisation is an answer to all problems, or even the leading factor within policy.
Rather, for each and every sector of the economy, assessment of policy must be
accompanied by an equal assessment of why corresponding goals have not been delivered
in the past and whether public ownership is necessary to overcome private business
‘weaknesses’.18
Nor are they liable to be troubled by the demands placed upon them in return for the
government’s efforts to ‘moderate wage settlements’ (p. 26). In this, the government is unli-
kely to be able to succeed over the long term in its intention, although it will condition, that
is weaken, the strength and determination with which the labour movement will be able to
engage in collective bargaining. Where it will deﬁnitely not succeed, and there is little evi-
dence that it has given any thought on how to achieve them, is in the goals to ‘moderate
price increases’ and ‘to cap pay and bonuses for senior managers and executives earning
over R550,000 per year’. To put it bluntly, if those earning this amount cannot ﬁnd ways
of getting around any (unspeciﬁed) mechanisms for imposing caps, they should not be in
their jobs in the ﬁrst place!
Now, as a framework, the NGP rarely addresses policy in detail. But after a short intro-
duction as ﬁrst section, and context setting as a second section, the third section, and the
vast majority of the document, is dedicated to the New Growth Path itself.19As will be
seen, it ranges far and wide but usually with a number of characteristics in common.
First is the failure of the analyses and the proposals to draw in much way at all upon the
peculiar circumstances of the South African economy, let alone those of a developing
economy more generally seeking to undergo economic and social transformation. In
short, irrespective of merits, with a few amendments in the wording, this document
could be equally applicable to any other economy. Second, the merits of the discussion
are few and far between and not simply for lack of attachment to the speciﬁcity of South
Africa and its needs. For, it is not only the developmental state that appears as a buzzword
in the NGP but a sack of others as well, with no acknowledgement of the critical thought
and failed expectations to which they have been attached elsewhere in the world and,
indeed, within South Africa itself. Third, this renders much of the discussion mundane,
conservative, wrong, inconsistent, or arbitrary and, most important of all, with little
purchase on how there is a breach with the old growth path and with the economic,
social, political and institutional conditions that sustained it.
The speciﬁcation of the NGP does open with a short discussion on sequencing the tran-
sition to a new growth path across three phases – the short, medium and long term. These
are more motivated by uncritical orthodox economic theory than empirical realities about
what can be changed in certain time frames and with what priorities and, as such, are essen-
tially arbitrary. The casual appeal to orthodoxy is then continued by seeking to balance the
NGP’s supply-side emphasis against the role of demand, not least because in South Africa,
‘the domestic market is relatively narrow due to the relatively small population, low
employment levels and deep inequalities’ (p. 8; emphasis added). The proposed remedy
is to draw upon Southern African regional markets. The issue here is not whether this is
desirable in and of itself (together with export success) but the total failure to recognise
the solution to the problem that has already been identiﬁed in the way in which it has
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been posed. If low employment levels and deep inequalities are the source of low demand
for domestic production, all three of these can be addressed together by expanding employ-
ment, reducing inequality, and expanding domestic demand!
Instead we are offered an extraordinary exploration of job creation through presentation
of a graph of xy ¼ 3.5% or so, where x is the employment intensity of growth and y is the
rate of growth of GDP required to create 500,000 jobs per year. This is simply arithmetic
with no analytical content whatsoever other than to suggest it is better to have a higher rate
of growth and a higher intensity of employment if you want to increase employment. We are
then offered ﬁve job drivers: infrastructure; main economic sectors; new economic devel-
opments; public services; and spatial development. Wish ﬁgures in terms of targets for
employment creation are given but without much substance, and some of the rationale is
troublesome. For example, 55% of a doubling of energy provision by 2030 is from renew-
ables (albeit 25% from nuclear) implying, of course, 45% from non-renewables, presum-
ably coal-ﬁred. This does not do much for greening of the economy that is so heavily
signalled elsewhere in the framework.
From job drivers, the NGP then shifts to yet another framework (beyond developmental
state and job drivers), involving ‘packages’ for macroeconomics, microeconomics and
social consensus (see above). The macroeconomics covers less than a page (p. 16), and
makes the concession of a looser monetary policy but balanced by a tighter ﬁscal policy.
Otherwise, it is difﬁcult to discern anything that would distinguish it from the old
growth path or trouble the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To reiterate, the macroeco-
nomic package is one that fails to recognise the key issue of capital ﬂight, and the corre-
sponding impact this has had on both putative trade-offs and the levels of the exchange
and interest rates. The macroeconomic package makes no reference to the levels of invest-
ment that need to be generated and how this will be achieved.
This is sheer speculation but the macroeconomic package might just as well have been
written by Treasury, or have been deferential to its continuing concerns (and those of the old
growth path). For the undoubted need for lower exchange and interest rates is hedged by
concerns that the beneﬁts of these will be squandered in higher wages (and prices) rather
than improved performance. The lesson to be drawn here is of the need to get beyond
this simple impasse of macro-constraining the micro, and to address the two together in
terms of ensuring adequate levels of investment through total reform of the ﬁnancial and
banking system.
The microeconomic package, by contrast to the macro, is much more expansive and
offers 10 programmes20 and, interestingly, the goal of controlling inﬂationary pressures
(p. 17). This is a welcome if unwitting recognition that the division between macroeco-
nomics and microeconomics is unsustainable as inﬂation control surely belongs to macro-
economics. But I have something else in mind, that active industrial policy (Programme 1),
rural development (Programme 2), labour market policies (Programme 7), and so on are
both macro and micro simultaneously or, more exactly, dissolve the distinction between
the two and should be considered on their own merits as speciﬁc sets of policies geared
to bring about economic and social transformation. Each is of sufﬁcient weight that it
should not be considered micro, and each is of such signiﬁcance that it should be integrated
into an understanding of the workings of the economy (and society) as a whole.
There is much to commend, for example, the industrial policy that is being developed
by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and what is now its Industrial Policy Action
Plan (IPAP3). I am more or less bound to say this as, without wishing to claim any credit, it
parallels closely the approach of the policy document that I wrote for the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU) some 15 years previously, emphasising the need both to
564 B. Fine
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
en
 Fi
ne
] a
t 1
1:1
4 0
5 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
address vertical, sectoral policies, and horizontal, strategic initiatives (Fine 1997). But,
amongst other such systemic considerations, I placed considerable emphasis upon the
mobilisation and allocation of ﬁnance for investment, for which the NGP does offer a
limited programme – essentially insufﬁcient ends without sufﬁcient means, ranging over
reorientation and strengthening of the funding potential from existing state corporations
and ﬁnancial institutions such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the
Public Investment Corporation (PIC) and PostBank (p. 27). The point, however, is not
that we have too little ﬁnancial activity, but too much within the private sector, and it is
this that must be redressed rather than its being complemented by state interventions in par-
allel to make up for its deﬁciencies.
Otherwise, there are some glaring inadequacies in the proposals. For competition policy
(Programme 3), for example, there is a failure to take account of its inability to deal with the
issues involved even if fully and effectively implemented. This was argued for steel in a
paper drafted at much the same time as that on industrial policy (Fine 1998), and, of
course, the government’s problems with steel have subsequently worsened and revealed
the limitations of its existing powers. Much the same has been exposed by the recent travails
over the entrance of Walmart into South Africa to the apparent dissatisfaction of NGP Min-
ister Patel. The simple point is that competition policy is liable to be insufﬁcient in and of
itself as a lever of industrial policy. It is at most a heavily contested barrier to what private
capital might do; it does not positively address the necessary issues of policy around levels
of investment, markets served, employment generated, technology deployed, etc.
Similarly, all the skills and training initiatives (Programme 4) in the world do nothing to
improve outcomes in the absence of job creation. And reliance upon small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and microﬁnance (Programme 5) has surely long since passed
its sell-by date given the voluminous critical literature in terms of how much it can
deliver and what it delivers. Besides, the prospects for these depend much more on a
vibrant economy than the other way about. Otherwise, there is a welcome recognition
that broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) (Programme 6) has been entirely
unsatisfactory but no attempt to explain why this should have been so as both cause and
symptom of South Africa’s economic malaise. To put it in the vernacular, a new black
elite has beneﬁted from the processes of economic and social restructuring in a way that
has been entirely parasitical and the exact antithesis of an aspiring indigenous, developmen-
tal bourgeoisie.
Concluding remarks
The NGP framework is strong on good intentions and rhetoric but, at the end of the day, is
sorely disappointing. I have pointed to one major elephant in the room which it ignores
altogether (capital ﬂight). This beast is a major factor in and of itself and as a symbol of
the power of ﬁnance that needs to be overcome if any new type of growth path is to
come onto the agenda. Even if we are not blind to this elephant, there is another one on
which it stands, the MEC. This continues to drive the economy and underpins the symp-
toms that the NGP seeks to address. At least the framework recognises the role played
by the MEC in dictating a high capital-intensive trajectory at the expense of employment
creation for serving domestic needs, if not acknowledging the MEC as such itself.
Instead, it offers a few imaginary elephants of its own around which it gingerly manoeuvres,
most of which reﬂect a lack of critical thinking, a failure to engage with South African rea-
lities and, most worryingly of all, a discourse of consensus-cum-sacriﬁce within the
working class, not least to be delivered by trade union members in particular to allow
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‘real gains for the working class as a whole’ (p. 29). Surely the time has come when ‘com-
mitment to policies that support employment creation and equity’ should be sought, if not
demanded, from capital, even imposed upon it, rather than through the sacriﬁce of trade
unionists? In this respect, careful reading of the framework from such a perspective
reveals that its politics are addressed at the labour movement with the aim of incorporating
its quiescence in return for programmes which ought to be delivered in any case and which
are all the less likely to be delivered the more the labour movement trims its energies.
Of course, the NGP is but one policy document that sets the context within which policy
will be debated, struggled over and, ultimately, implemented with or without intended out-
comes being realised. And, equally, some might accept many or all of the criticisms levelled
here, and more, and still see the NGP as a strategic step forward (over the old growth path)
and the basis on which further progress might be built. Such postures can hardly be faulted
for their optimism. Whether they represent realism is another matter. The more likely pro-
spect is for a partially implemented and watered-down programme, with limited impact,
growing dissent within the intended social dialogue and partnership, and business, unem-
ployment, inequality and poverty continuing as unusual for post-apartheid economy and
society that is so desperately in need of a genuinely new set of paths.
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Notes
1. ‘The New Growth Path: The framework’, Economic Development Department, South Africa,
2010. Some of the arguments offered here are developed at greater length in the references
listed. Thanks for comments on an earlier draft, especially from referees and editor, account
of which was not always possible in view of a wish to retain the draft in its original form
other than for minor corrections.
2. See http://www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2012/.
3. See Handley (2005) including discussion on whether pressure from international markets needs
to be overt and direct or is internalised by policymakers.
4. See also Bassett (2008) for the need for elite interests to be embedded in, or accommodating to,
a broader hegemonic politics – but how broad, and deep, is a moot point.
5. See Cornwall and Eade (2010).
6. The text immediately continues, ‘The deep inequalities that rend our society complicate efforts
to reach consensus’, a recognition perhaps that the rich and powerful will defend their privileges
and that consensus will not be able to redress them?
7. It is necessary to be mindful that this is a framework and not a work of scholarship, and to be
assessed as such. Nonetheless, the framework reﬂects analytical stances, however consciously,
fully, and consistently, and is open to be assessed as such.
8. The term risk recurs throughout the document and is indicative of being sensitive to conserva-
tive and ﬁnancial reaction as well as unwittingly symbolic of the supposed commodity, risk, that
is traded in ﬁnancial markets.
9. For a full account, see Ashman et al. (2011), a contribution based on submission in response to
declaration of amnesty (see below).
10. Note also that, in my debate with the Harvard Group, it continues to fail to address this problem
even though it could not be made more prominent in critique of them, (Fine 2009a, 2009b) and
(Hausmann and Andrews 2009). See below for implications for macroeconomic policy.
11. For an overview of ﬁnancialisation, see (Fine 2011b).
12. See (Freund 2011) for South Africa as a developmental state in the apartheid past.
13. There has been a subtle and unnoticed redeﬁnition of GDP to include ﬁnancial services where
previously it was excluded. But what is provided in practice by ﬁnancial services? The answer is
566 B. Fine
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
en
 Fi
ne
] a
t 1
1:1
4 0
5 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
trading in risk, putatively redistributing it to those more willing to bear it (as opposed to the
reality of creating it for those who cannot). See Christophers (2011).
14. The elephant of capital ﬂight is also to be found across Africa as documented in a series of
co-authored papers and, most recently, Ndikumana and Boyce (2011).
15. For a critique of the space being opened by the IMF in this regard, see Gallagher (2011).
16. See Fine (2012a) for some discussion of this, noting that it has only recently become more
prominent in Chinese policymaking.
17. For my own (co-authored) contributions on this, see Ashman et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Fine
(2004, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a), Fine and Stoneman (1996) and
Fine and Rustomjee (1997).
18. See Bayliss and Fine (2008) for general arguments around water and electricity, and Kgara and
Barsel (2010) for pharmaceuticals, for example.
19. A fourth section offers a cursory programme for implementation and is followed by an appendix
with an outline for the ﬁve job drivers.
20. Those not mentioned in what follows are Programmes 8 (technology), 9 (trade) and 10 (Africa).
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